Margalla News | Special research review
The history of the rise of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be placed into two separate boxes. Armed organisations, tribal connections, religious seminaries and state decisions on both sides of the border have influenced each other. Years ago, senior journalist and author of Taliban Ahmed Rashid warned about growing Talibanisation in Pakistan. His warning remains an important reference for understanding subsequent conflicts.
In an account of an earlier address, Rashid described the risk of Talibanisation in Pakistan as growing. He drew links between fighters crossing into Pakistan after 2001, the spread of militancy in the tribal regions and the reorganisation of local armed groups. These were historical remarks and should not be presented as a new 2026 press conference.
The central argument of his research is that permanently dividing organisations linked by similar ideological traditions into "good" and "bad" groups can be extremely difficult. A crucial question for Pakistani political and military decision-makers has been how cooperation with a force in Afghanistan may affect internal security.
In the 1990s, the Afghan Taliban emerged as an armed movement and took power. After 2001, their leaders and members dispersed across different areas. Many researchers say the insurgency in border regions also affected militancy inside Pakistan. However, the history, leadership and objectives of each Pakistani armed group were distinct; treating them as one organisation would be inaccurate.
Rashid also highlighted attacks on local elders in Pakistan's tribal areas, repeated temporary agreements and weak civilian institutions. Armed groups may find opportunities to expand their influence when local representation is weakened and people lack dependable access to justice, education and employment.
Poverty alone cannot explain extremism. Ideological organisation, wartime financing, organised weapons networks, outside conflicts and particular military and political choices also matter. Strong administrative institutions, fair resolution of local grievances and disruption of armed groups' funding and supplies belong within a combined strategy.
American policy failures also featured in accounts of Rashid's remarks. Subordinating state-building in Afghanistan to battlefield success, reliance on certain local warlords and failure to effectively contain the narcotics economy were among the issues complicating the prolonged crisis.
Pakistan has lost thousands of civilians and security personnel to terrorism. Historical policy assessments are incomplete if these losses are ignored. Afghanistan likewise suffered irreparable human, educational and economic damage over decades of warfare.
Applying historical examples directly to current disputes requires caution. Today the Taliban govern Afghanistan, Pakistan's military and civilian institutional circumstances differ from the past, and the roles of China, Russia, Iran and Central Asia in the region have grown. Earlier events provide context, not proof of every new allegation.
A better journalistic question is what lessons have been learned: Does the state reject terrorism according to consistent standards? Do residents of affected regions have a voice in peace policy? Are Pakistan and Afghanistan taking jointly verifiable steps to prevent cross-border violence originating on their territories?
The enduring message of Rashid's earlier warnings is that accommodating armed ideological groups for short-term military advantage can create long-term threats to the state itself and to its neighbours. This conclusion should be considered alongside sustained historical research rather than turned into a political slogan.
Sources and acknowledgments: Margalla News thanks Ahmed Rashid for the historical and analytical insights from his research, speeches and reported remarks. This is an independent Margalla News article, not a full or literal translation of his work. Reports of his remarks by other journalists are attributed accordingly.