Margalla News | Special research review
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has long posed a major challenge to Pakistan's security. Military operations, arrests, border monitoring and different negotiation efforts have failed to end the problem permanently. In a January 2023 column, scientist and commentator Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy asked why a state with extensive military capabilities struggled to defeat a comparatively smaller armed organisation decisively.
According to Hoodbhoy, military strength and the ability to manage a complex insurgency are not always the same. Armed groups may have ideological training, cross-border movement, local connections and decentralised organisational structures that conventional military superiority alone cannot easily eliminate.
His column described Pakistan's policy toward the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan as a major strategic error. He argued that expecting a permanently secure distinction between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP was unrealistic in light of their ideological and historical relationships.
However, a distinction between these organisations exists. The Afghan Taliban are the ruling movement in Afghanistan, whereas the TTP operates against the Pakistani state. It would be wrong, without evidence, to say that one central leadership directs every operation of both groups. Their links and degree of cooperation may vary by location, period and individual.
Pakistanis have lost many lives in TTP attacks. The Army Public School attack and other major incidents are reminders of the gravity of this violence. Protecting civilians is the state's foremost responsibility, but immediate retaliatory operations alone do not produce a durable system of safety.
Counterterrorism policy has three important dimensions: disrupting armed networks, establishing fair governance in affected areas and addressing social and political factors behind militant recruitment. Neglecting any of these over time may make battlefield successes temporary.
Hoodbhoy's criticism is also relevant to domestic political debate in Pakistan. Listening to grievances among civilians during action against militants, complying with the law in detention and investigation, and creating a credible judicial process for victims all reinforce the state's legitimacy.
Relations with Afghanistan complicate the issue further. If Islamabad alleges the existence of safe havens across the border, it should provide evidence sufficiently specific for discussion through diplomatic or joint security channels. Kabul also has a responsibility to prevent its territory being used for armed attacks on other countries.
When air power is used in response to cross-border attacks, questions of civilian protection and sovereignty arise. A credible counterterrorism strategy must avoid generating new hatred and distrust among the population of another country while attempting to reduce an existing threat.
Hoodbhoy's 2023 column is not a definitive account of all circumstances in 2026; its figures and contemporary incidents are historical. But its core question remains relevant: why can militancy resurface despite sustained force, and is the state willing to review strategic mistakes openly?
The response cannot be reduced to a single phrase or military operation. Credible diplomacy between Pakistan and Afghanistan, specific measures against armed groups and protection of civilians on both sides are foundations without which lasting peace will be difficult.
Sources and acknowledgments: Margalla News thanks Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy for the historical and analytical insights from his original research and public writing. This is Margalla News's own article, not a full or literal translation. Where his comments were reported by another journalist, they are identified as such.