Margalla News | Special research review
Afghanistan's twenty-year war is often reduced to a few major events: battlefield victory, withdrawal and the Taliban's return. But the story of the state built between 2001 and 2021, Afghan society's expectations and outside powers' objectives is far more complex. In a March 2025 article, Afghanistan expert Barnett R. Rubin argued that counterterrorism was prioritised over political reconciliation and state-building from the beginning.
Rubin was involved in diplomatic and research work relating to Afghanistan over many years. According to him, the Bonn process of 2001 was intended to include the relevant sections of Afghan society, but possibilities for Taliban political participation were restricted too quickly. In his view, that early decision helped create space for the later armed insurgency.
A necessary question is whether Taliban inclusion would really have brought lasting peace. History cannot provide a definitive answer. There were also serious concerns about the Taliban's previous rule, armed activities and restrictions on women's and civil rights. Nevertheless, excluding potential negotiating opportunities from the outset was a significant political choice.
Another central concern in Rubin's analysis is the shifting nature of American goals. Washington wanted to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries while simultaneously building institutions of governance in Afghanistan with broad public support. Success becomes hard to define when contradictory methods are used to pursue the two goals.
Pakistan was a major regional actor in the war. It cooperated with the United States on military logistics and counterterrorism, but American and Afghan officials repeatedly raised concerns about Afghan Taliban networks in Pakistan. Islamabad rejected various accusations and stressed protection of its own security and regional interests.
Pakistan is not the sole determining factor in Rubin's writing. He also questions US government priorities, problems facing Afghan political leaders, allied forces' methods and the structures of international assistance. This exposes the limitations of explaining the Afghan war solely through one neighbour's role.
The human costs of war cannot be measured through military casualties alone. Large numbers of families experienced displacement, rural economies suffered, and institutions built in education, health and cities operated amid prolonged uncertainty. The sudden 2021 withdrawal exposed these institutional weaknesses at extraordinary speed.
Basic rights for Afghans did not cease to matter with the Taliban's return to power. Restrictions on women's education and employment, in particular, affect economic capacity and civil liberties. The failure of foreign intervention is not an endorsement of every policy pursued by the new government.
Pakistan, Iran, India, China, Russia and Central Asian states have both security and commercial reasons to engage with Afghanistan. But if each regards Kabul primarily as a tool in regional rivalry, Afghan citizens' political and economic priorities may once again be pushed aside.
The broader lesson drawn from Rubin's article is that a durable political settlement remains essential despite military pressure. Such a settlement would need separate, clear arrangements for local representation, trust in state institutions, civil rights and neighbours' legitimate security concerns.
Past research matters when developing new Afghanistan policy, but it cannot provide automatic answers to contemporary events. A better approach would consider Afghans' voices, actual regional economic connections and protection against armed violence together.
Sources and acknowledgments: Margalla News recognises the historical and analytical insights from Barnett Rubin's research, talks and published writing. This is Margalla News's own analysis, not a full or word-for-word translation. Where his remarks appeared in an interview or report by another journalist, that distinction is preserved.