Soviet tanks once burned in Afghanistan's mountains. Today Afghan military representatives are observing Russian exercises and viewing drones, long-range missiles, heavy weapons and robotic systems. The contrast captures a profound change in Moscow-Kabul relations.
Russia's contacts with the Taliban predate their return to Kabul in 2021. Moscow hosted talks involving Taliban representatives in 2018 and 2019 even while the movement remained legally banned in Russia. By 2024, Taliban representatives were invited to the St Petersburg International Economic Forum.
Russia's Supreme Court suspended the ban on Taliban activities on 17 April 2025. On 3 July 2025, Russia became the first country to formally recognise the Taliban government, accepting the credentials of the new Afghan ambassador and pointing to cooperation in security, counter-terrorism, energy, transport, agriculture and infrastructure.
The relationship moved further in May 2026. Russia and Afghanistan signed a military-technical cooperation agreement in Moscow. The full text has not been released, but Afghan Defence Minister Mohammad Yaqoob Mujahid and Russian envoy Zamir Kabulov later described the immediate focus as repair and maintenance of Russian and Soviet-origin equipment already in Afghanistan, including helicopters and aircraft. This does not establish that Moscow has decided to provide a new missile system, combat-aircraft fleet or major weapons package, though the framework could support spare parts, maintenance, technical training and future contracts.
Afghanistan's participation in Russia's Center-2026 exercises therefore looks like another step in a relationship becoming more institutional.
Geography helps explain Moscow's interest. Afghanistan does not directly border Russia, but Central Asian states to its north remain central to Russian security. ISIS-K has added urgency: the group claimed the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack near Moscow, demonstrating the reach of militant networks linked to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
Trade is the other side of the relationship. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk said Russian statistics put bilateral trade at about $326 million in 2025, while Afghan figures put it around $500 million. He said trade in the first two months of 2026 was 2.6 times higher than a year earlier. In November 2025, about 5,000 tonnes of Russian diesel travelled through Iran to Afghanistan on the Khaf-Herat rail route, illustrating a practical Russia-Iran-Afghanistan trade connection.
For Kabul, Russia offers recognition and options. Most governments have continued contacts with the Taliban without formal recognition, amid international criticism over restrictions on women and girls. Russia's recognition therefore carried major diplomatic value. Afghanistan also holds Russian and Soviet-origin military equipment that requires maintenance, parts and technical expertise.
Closer ties with Russia can sit alongside Afghanistan's relations with China, Iran, India and Central Asia, reducing dependence on any single external partner.
Pakistan makes the equation more sensitive. Islamabad accuses the TTP of operating from Afghan territory, an allegation Kabul rejects. Border violence and airstrikes have deepened tensions, including the October 1, 2026 strikes with sharply conflicting accounts from the two sides.
There is, however, no credible evidence that Russia's Afghanistan policy is fundamentally designed against Pakistan. Moscow has interests with Islamabad as well and is more likely to seek influence with both capitals.
The eighth Moscow Format meeting on 5 October 2026 illustrates that ambition. Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Iran, India and Central Asian states are represented. Russian envoy Zamir Kabulov has said Moscow is ready to use the format to encourage compromise between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi travelled to Russia for the meeting and is due to meet Sergey Lavrov separately.
Moscow may not simply want to be Kabul's friend. It wants to host the table at which others discuss Afghanistan.
In 1979 Moscow sent troops into Afghanistan. In 2026 it is seeking influence rather than occupation—through diplomacy, trade, technical agreements and regional institutions.
The relationship may not be built on trust. It is built on intersecting needs. In international politics, that can sometimes prove more durable than friendship.