Review period: October 2025 to 1 October 2026.
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have moved beyond periodic border tension into a cycle of airstrikes, artillery fire, retaliatory operations and diplomacy. The most persistent consequence has been civilian harm inside Afghanistan.
UNAMA documented 499 civilians killed and 1,216 injured inside Afghanistan as a result of cross-border armed violence between 1 October 2025 and 30 June 2026, a total of 1,715 civilian casualties. These figures cover casualties inside Afghanistan and do not include losses in Pakistan.
On 28 June, UNAMA initially confirmed 28 civilians killed and 49 injured in Pakistani airstrikes in Paktya, Paktika and Kunar. A later quarterly account revised the number of injured to 189, including 185 wounded in Chamkani, Paktya, where 22 civilians were killed. On 1 October, UNAMA confirmed another 10 civilians killed, most of them children, and nine injured in strikes in Kunar and Helmand. It said cross-border armed violence had caused more than 1,100 civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan so far in 2026.
The escalation has included the October 2025 border fighting, November strikes, Pakistani airstrikes in Nangarhar and Paktika on 21-22 February, large-scale hostilities from 26 February to 5 March, the 16 March strike that affected Kabul’s Omid addiction-treatment hospital, shelling in Kunar in late April, the June 28 airstrikes, and further strikes in September and October.
The Kabul hospital strike marked a significant expansion of the conflict beyond border areas. UNAMA said dozens were reportedly killed and injured and stressed the special protection afforded to medical facilities under international humanitarian law. Before that incident, it had already documented 76 civilian deaths and 213 injuries since 26 February.
Kabul has not remained silent. Afghan officials have condemned Pakistani strikes, accused Pakistan of civilian harm, taken retaliatory military action and participated in negotiations. The analytical question is therefore not whether Kabul has reacted, but whether its response is seen by the public as sufficient to deter further attacks and protect civilians.
The humanitarian effects have been substantial. UN reporting recorded 185 civilian casualties from 26 February to 5 March. OCHA preliminary data estimated about 16,400 households were displaced in affected eastern provinces, while WFP paused activities in affected areas, disrupting food distributions for roughly 160,000 people.
Public pressure does not necessarily translate into support for a wider war. Afghans may simultaneously demand an end to Pakistani strikes and fear another prolonged conflict, further displacement, border closures and economic damage.
Kabul broadly faces three policy paths: stronger diplomatic pressure through regional and international actors; military responses that may demonstrate resolve but raise escalation risks; and negotiations addressing the core security dispute. Pakistan says TTP militants use Afghan territory to attack Pakistan, while Kabul rejects that accusation. Pakistan has also rejected UNAMA casualty findings and says its operations target militant infrastructure.
The durability of any ceasefire is likely to depend on whether the parties can establish workable arrangements around TTP-related security concerns, border security, mutual confidence and an end to cross-border strikes. UN human-rights experts have called for a permanent ceasefire, action on the root causes of the conflict and compliance with international law.
The author’s conclusion is that civilian protection, an end to cross-border military actions, a verifiable mechanism addressing Pakistan’s TTP concerns and direct political negotiations would need to be addressed within the same framework for a more durable settlement.
Note: This is an analytical article by Abrar Ibrahim. Policy judgments and interpretations are the author’s and do not represent the editorial position of Margalla News.